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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the determinants of bank profitability in the early 
transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and in the late transition countries 
of the former USSR. We apply a GMM technique for the period covering 2000-2013. The 
results show that profitability persists and the determinants of bank profitability vary across 
transition countries. Particularly, the banking sector of early transition countries is more 
competitive. However, the impact of credit risk on bank profitability is positive in early 
transition countries, but negative in late transition countries. Government spending and 
monetary freedom negatively influence bank profitability only in late transition countries. 
Moreover, better capitalised banks are more profitable in early transition countries implying 
that these banking sectors are more robust. A range of possible approaches that governments 
can take to further develop banking sectors are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
It has now been almost three decades since the collapse of the socialist system, and many 
previously centrally planned economies have established market-based economies.  Most 
countries have followed a similar approach to overcoming the legacy of the Soviet system.  
Although the speed and sequence of reform varied across countries, all were influenced by 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the so called Washington consensus, 
which focused on liberalisation, stabilisation and privatisation.  The soviet-style mono-banks 
were abolished and restrictions on the internal convertibility of money removed, state control 
of interest rates was suspended, and the privatisation of state-owned banks took place very 
early although with varying degrees of success (Fries et al., 2002). In addition, transition 
countries completed two major reforms. The first was the introduction of a two-tier banking 
system to separate the central bank from the commercial banking sector.  This also included 
the division of large industrial banks into smaller organisations to create competition in the 
sector. This resulted in a move away from a system where the primary goal of the banks was 
to transfer state funds to state-owned enterprises for investment projects approved by central 
planning to a system appropriate to a market economy. The incumbent systems were 
inefficient in terms of resource allocation and the quality of banking supervision, and risk 
assessment was poor.  The second was the establishment of a system of financial 
intermediation to increase saving and investment.  The importance of these reforms was 
recognised by the governments of all the transition economies.  However, while the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Baltic States (the early transition group) began 
structural reforms in the 1990’s, and have to a large extent created efficient banking sectors, 
in the former Soviet Union states (the late transition group) this process is still not complete.  
Although the share of bank domestic credit over GDP is relatively higher in the early 
transition countries, it can be shown that the banks are universally the most important 
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component of the financial sector (Table 1). Considering the vital role of banking in 
developing and transition countries, improvement in profitability can have a significant 
impact on the allocation of financial resources (Sufian and Habibullah, 2010). Moreover, 
recent studies show that a profitable banking sector better withstands negative shocks and 
thus contributes to the stability of the financial system (Athanasoglou et al., 2008). Therefore, 
research that investigates the factors driving bank performance and profitability is important 
in order to inform strategies for future financial and economic development. 
Table 1. Domestic credit provided by banks (% of GDP) 
Year Late Transition countries Early Transition countries 
 Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Kazakhstan Czech 
Republic 
Estonia Hungary Lithuania 
2013 43.80 
(46.00) 
25.36 
(25.49) 
39.83 
(42.91) 
35.58 
(39.08) 
55.28 
(66.97) 
73.67 
(71.60) 
50.72 
(64.69) 
46.21 
(51.05) 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 2014. The numbers in brackets show the domestic credit  
provided by the financial sectors (% of GDP)  
Recent studies largely focus on the determinants of bank profitability in developed 
and developing countries (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011; García-
Herrero et al., 2009; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013).  However, research directed to transition 
countries, and particularly the countries of the former USSR, is limited. Moreover, banks 
behave differently under different institutional settings, which implies that the results 
obtained for developed and developing countries may not apply to those in transition to a 
market economy (Berger et al., 2001; Berger and Udell, 2002; Haselmann and Wachtel, 
2007). In addition, transition countries have a number of unique characteristics, and 
government policies and regulations can differ from those in developed and developing 
countries. The relevant studies mostly consider bank-specific, industry-specific and 
macroeconomic variables as determinants in an investigation of bank profitability. However, 
these do not take account of environmental conditions, government policy and regulation, and 
thus it is premature to apply the results to transition country banking sectors. Therefore, this 
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paper also includes national environmental factors such as government spending and fiscal 
and monetary freedom as they may be important in explaining bank profitability.  
The aim of this paper is to investigate the determinants of bank profitability for early 
(CEE and the Baltic States) and late (former USSR) transition countries for the period 2000-
2013. This study is important as it contributes to the existing literature in several aspects.  
Firstly, it uses a richer dataset that covers the period before, during and after the recent global 
crisis period (2000-2013) for these countries.  Second, it includes the special conditions of 
early and late transition countries, and allows an examination of environmental factors and 
their impact on bank profitability.  Third, existing studies on bank profitability use either 
static  (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; Staikouras and Wood, 2004; Sufian and Habibullah, 
2010) or dynamic approaches (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011).  
However, in this paper robust conclusions can be drawn using both approaches. 
This paper builds on research by Athanasoglou et al. (2008), Dietrich and Wanzenried 
(2011) and Sufian and Habibullah (2010). The results are interesting not only for academics 
and bank officials, but also for other stakeholders such as policy-makers, central bankers and 
other financial authorities. The results show that the quality of asset allocation needs further 
improvement in late transition countries. In addition, better capitalised banks are found to be 
more profitable in early transition countries. Moreover, indicators of economic freedom, such 
as government spending and flexible monetary policy, still have a negative impact on bank 
profitability in late transition countries. This suggests that policy-makers need to consider 
further reform in these areas.  
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 highlights the difference between early 
and late transition countries and discusses the relevant empirical literature. Section 3 
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describes the data and methods used. Section 4 presents the findings from the empirical 
analysis, and Section 5 concludes and suggests some policy recommendations.  
 2. Theoretical background 
2.1. Economic transition in the countries of the former USSR 
Over the last three decades, a plethora of studies have focused on the transition of countries 
of CEE from a system of central planning to a market economy (Fries et al., 2002; Fries and 
Taci, 2005; Kenjegalieva and Simper, 2011). However, the majority of the former Soviet 
countries have been largely ignored due to the paucity of reliable information (Djalilov and 
Piesse, 2011; Schobert, 2006).  This is a serious omission as these countries are substantially 
different from the early transition countries in CEE in a number of important respects. Firstly, 
the former Soviet countries were controlled by the communist regime for more than seventy 
years. This resulted in a lack of a national collective memory of any other form of economic 
organisation, and the institutions in these countries were largely impenetrable. Furthermore, 
the leadership had no experience of managing a domestic market economy prior to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 as decisions were made centrally. When reforms to 
establish a market economy in the Baltic States and in several countries in CEE began during 
the Gorbachev era of the late 1980s, other countries of the former USSR did not follow suit.  
Thus, there existed a sharp contrast between countries such as Hungary, Poland and the 
former Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic States, which only had a system of central planning for 
the period following the Second World War until the 1990s, and those in Central Asia. This 
historical legacy has had a significant impact on how quickly a market economy can be 
established, and emphasises the importance of the initial conditions at the start of the 
transition on the direction and speed of financial sector development and its impact on 
financial development and economic growth.  
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Secondly, many former Soviet countries are rich in mineral and energy resources.  
This has implications for their economic growth, but also provides a source of potential 
internal conflict that is associated with the problem of resource allocation. Thirdly, some 
former USSR countries, especially those located in Central Asia, are geographically 
extensive, and the political instability in neighbouring countries, such as Afghanistan, can be 
contagious. For these countries, maintaining economic growth and ensuring financial stability 
are vital to retaining social cohesion and sustained development. Fourthly, early (CEE and 
the Baltic States) and late (former USSR) transition countries have taken significantly 
different approaches to the transition from a planned to a market economy. The first group 
pursued a revolutionary approach and most of them became EU members in 2004, while late 
transition countries took an evolutionary (step by step) approach, which has lasted for more 
than two decades. Therefore, research distinguishing these two groups of transition countries 
provides new empirical findings.  
 
2.2. The Literature on the determinants of bank profitability 
The existing literature uses several variables, both internal and external to the organisation, to 
explain bank profitability, depending on the focus of the research. The microeconomic 
determinants of profitability are those linked to management, strategy and performance, 
whilst the macroeconomic determinants relate to the nature of the national institutions and 
economic environment within which the banks operate.  
Following earlier studies (Bourke, 1989; Short, 1979) recent research  has examined 
bank profitability at the country level (Ben Naceur and Goaied, 2008; Berger, 1995a; Daly 
and Zhang, 2014; Guru et al., 2002; Mamatzakis and Remoundos, 2003; Pasiouras and 
Kosmidou, 2007; Sufian and Habibullah, 2012, 2010) or  cross-country analyses (Albertazzi 
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and Gambacorta, 2009; Goddard et al., 2004a; Hsieh and Lee, 2010; Molyneux and Thornton, 
1992; Naceur and Omran, 2011). Although the results vary considerably as data availability 
is not consistent across countries there are some common elements, particularly in the choice 
of elements internal to the firm, such as size and capital and risk management, that impact 
bank profitability.  
Size is an important determinant of performance if there are economies or 
diseconomies of scale. Additionally, some studies claim that the effect of external variables 
on profitability is closely linked to bank size (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000). Based on 
these results the studies can be divided into two groups:  those that find a positive link 
between size and profitability  (Flamini et al., 2009; Smirlock, 1985) and those that find this 
to be negative (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). The positive effect 
is driven by the finding that larger banks have more diversification in their products and 
services, and this reduces the level of risk and thus results in higher operational efficiency 
and profitability. In addition, larger banks can raise relatively cheap capital and thus appear to 
be more profitable (Short, 1979). Furthermore, some studies find that in a non-competitive 
environment larger banks with a significant market share enjoy higher profits by offering 
lower deposit rates, which are considered less risky, and by maintaining high lending rates 
(Flamini et al., 2009). In contrast, the opposing view is that an increase in bank size leads to 
higher levels of marketing and operational and bureaucratic costs, and results in a negative 
link between profitability and size. Thus, the scale effect on profitability remains ambiguous. 
Risk management is also included in most studies and poor asset quality and low 
levels of liquidity are two major factors influencing bank failure in the sector. Two types of 
risk, credit and liquidity risk, are most commonly addressed in these studies. Particularly 
during periods of increased uncertainty, banks tend to diversify their portfolios and raise their 
liquid holdings to reduce their risk. The ratio of loan loss provisions to loans is often used as 
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a proxy for credit risk (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013) with a higher ratio 
indicating lower credit quality, which ultimately leads to a lower profitability. However, as 
liquidity management, asset management and the level of cash flow to maintain the ability of 
the bank to meet current liabilities when they come due, custom and practice suggests that the 
ratio of loans to total assets is the preferred metric (Sufian and Habibullah, 2010). Again, 
results vary on the sign of this variable when determining the link between liquidity and 
profitability from positive (Bourke, 1989) to negative (Molyneux and Thornton, 1992). 
However, existing studies find a negative link between credit risk and profitability (Miller 
and Noulas, 1997). 
Capital is the third common variable that is internal to the bank, and this plays an 
important role in the determination of bank profitability in many studies.  This may proxy 
risk and regulatory costs in the presence of capital requirements (Flamini et al., 2009). 
However, the link between capital and profitability is again controversial in the literature. 
The traditional view suggests that a higher capital asset ratio increases funding costs and thus 
lowers profitability, as many papers consider the cost of capital, particularly, the cost of 
equity to be the most expensive bank liability in terms of expected return (García-Herrero et 
al., 2009; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013). Some studies suggest that an unexpected increase in capital 
raises profitability linking this into two hypotheses.  The first supports the view that 
increasing capital lowers payments on unsecured debt, while the second states that banks 
provide signals of better future prospects by increasing their capital (Berger, 1995b). Some 
studies find a positive relationship between capitalisation and bank profitability (Angbazo, 
1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Drakos, 2003; Maudos and De Guevara, 2004; 
Saunders and Schumacher, 2000), while others suggest the link to be absent (before the 
global crisis 2007-2009) and negative during the crisis (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011). 
9 
 
With respect to the macroeconomic and institutional variables, GDP growth, inflation 
and sector concentration are common in the literature as determinants of bank profitability. 
Profitability is found to be sensitive to GDP growth, suggesting that demand for loans 
increases during cyclical upswings, and that existing studies find the link between GDP 
growth and profitability to be positive (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011; Flamini et al., 2009; 
Goddard et al., 2004a; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013). Alternatively, when GDP growth slows, 
particularly during crises and recessions, the credit quality of banks worsens thus reducing 
profitability. However, the impact of inflation on profitability is ambiguous depending on 
whether inflation is anticipated or not (Perry, 1992). If inflation is anticipated banks can 
adjust their interest rates faster than their costs increase, thus impacting positively on 
profitability.  But where inflation is not anticipated, costs increase faster than any adjustment 
in interest rates so there is a negative impact on profitability. Therefore, some studies find the 
link to be positive (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Trujillo-Ponce, 2013), while others find it to be 
negative (Naceur and Omran, 2011).  
Two hypotheses are proposed to explain how the degree of sector concentration 
influences bank profitability. The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis states that 
a more concentrated sector favours higher profitability motivated by greater market power, 
whereas the efficient-structure (ES) hypothesis argues that higher efficiency enables efficient 
banks to gain more of a market share and thus generate higher profits. Although both 
hypotheses suggest the link between concentration and profitability to be positive, the 
empirical evidence is again not conclusive, with some studies finding a positive impact 
(Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008; Goddard et al., 2004b; Maudos and De Guevara, 2004), 
and others a negative one (Naceur and Omran, 2011).  
However, overwhelmingly the literature considers the effect of internal and external 
determinants of bank profitability for developed and developing countries while the states 
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that comprised the former USSR have not been extensively explored.  The literature review 
has shown that while the variables used are common to many studies, the direction of the 
impact is not consistent across countries. Moreover, only a limited number of studies take 
into account the effect of institutions and of economic freedom, as defined by the Heritage 
Foundation, on bank profitability (Sufian and Habibullah, 2010), and none consider these 
factors in transition countries. Thus, this paper fills this gap in the literature by exploring 
early and late transition countries using the most recent data (2000-2013), and including 
economic freedom variables from the Heritage Foundation.  
In any study of the role of banks in developing and transition countries, regulations 
and the quality of supervision are vitally important.  The aspects of governance perform two 
major functions, that is to safeguard the soundness of the financial sector, and ensure that 
banks meet basic fiduciary responsibilities. Both only succeed if the level of state 
involvement does not become so large that it threatens the sustainability of banking growth 
by introducing inefficiency and by increasing corruption.  
Table 2 reports indices for three groups of countries.  These measure fiscal freedom, 
government spending and monetary independence, all of which may have a significant 
impact on bank performance. These indices range from 0 to 100, where 100 implies high 
economic freedom. Fiscal freedom is a measure of the tax burden imposed by the 
government, where a higher score indicates less burden imposed by fiscal policy.  Higher 
scores for government spending and monetary policy imply the presence of their being less 
burden imposed by government expenditures, and higher price stability in the absence of state 
intervention, respectively.  
Table 2 shows that the fiscal burden and government spending are lower in late 
transition countries compared to the early transition ones. However, higher price stability is 
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present in early transition countries. The third group in Table 2 are developed countries, 
which are considered to be laissez faire economies according to the Heritage Foundation. 
Comparing these three groups shows that there is a clear trend, and as economies grow the 
fiscal burden and government spending increases and price stability improves. As the optimal 
level of economic freedom varies across countries, it is interesting to note the impact on 
banking profitability as a factor in determining policy relating to the future strategic 
development of the sector. 
Table 2. Economic Freedom Variables 
Countries year 
 
Fiscal 
freedom 
Government 
spending 
Monetary 
freedom 
Late transition countries 
Armenia 2013 88.00 82.10 73.00 
Azerbaijan 2013 85.50 67.80 73.50 
Belarus 2013 88.80 43.50 40.70 
Georgia 2013 88.20 68.90 72.60 
Kazakhstan 2013 93.20 84.50 72.20 
Moldova 2013 87.20 50.10 73.40 
Ukraine 2013 78.20 29.40 71.00 
Uzbekistan 2013 90.20 67.80 63.00 
Average  87.41 61.76 67.43 
Early transition countries 
Czech Rep 2013 82.00 43.50 81.70 
Estonia 2013 79.70 56.20 77.10 
Hungary 2013 79.70 29.70 77.10 
Latvia 2013 84.40 53.60 78.30 
Lithuania 2013 92.80 53.60 78.30 
Poland 2013 76.00 43.00 77.70 
Slovakia 2013 84.70 58.00 79.10 
Slovenia 2013 65.70 22.30 81.60 
Average  80.63 44.99 78.86 
Developed countries 
Austria 2013 51.10 23.50 79.30 
Canada 2013 79.80 44.80 75.20 
Denmark 2013 39.80 5.90 80.00 
France 2013 53.00 5.60 81.10 
Germany 2013 61.80 37.30 81.20 
Japan 2013 69.20 45.00 90.60 
The 
Netherlands 
2013 52.10 24.70 81.10 
United 
Kingdom 
2013 57.00 27.70 72.40 
United States 2013 69.30 47.80 75.00 
Average  59.23 29.14 79.54 
Source. The Heritage Foundation (2014) 
Although early transition countries have taken a relatively fast approach to transition 
and have become members of the EU, both groups of transition countries have undergone 
significant changes in state, fiscal and monetary policies. Governments have led reform 
programmes to drive the economic transformation in CEE since the end of the 1980’s, and in 
the former Soviet Union transition countries since the beginning of the 1990’s. There are 
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many channels through which the state can influence firm and sector level growth. 
Particularly, governments have a significant influence over the establishment of an 
environment that enables new firms to develop and grow. Thus, the first testable hypothesis is 
as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Government spending has an impact on bank profitability. 
The second channel by which governments impact on firm growth is fiscal policy. In 
transition countries, where the institutions are still relatively weak and legislation changes 
quickly, the significant tax burden encourages entrepreneurs to move into the informal and 
shadow economy (Smallbone and Welter, 2001). Thus, the second testable hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Fiscal freedom has an impact on bank profitability. 
Governments, particularly those of late transition countries, influence the 
sustainability of  banking growth through reforms that address the development of economic 
institutions such as central banks and other financial institutions, which are responsible for 
monetary policy, price stability and interest rates (Smallbone and Welter, 2001). As the banks 
of the former USSR states generate revenue largely from conventional banking, their 
profitability may be influenced by price stability, changes in money supply and interest rates. 
Therefore, the final testable hypothesis is as follows:   
Hypothesis 3: Monetary freedom has an impact on bank profitability. 
2.3. Variable selection 
Table 3 lists the variables used in the study. Following the literature, return on assets (ROA) 
is the dependent variable, This is the profit earned per dollar of assets, and reflects the ability 
of management to utilise the bank resources to generate profits (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; 
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Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011; Flamini et al., 2009; Sufian and Habibullah, 2010). This was 
chosen in preference to return on equity (ROE), as the latter disregards financial leverage and 
the risks associated with that (Flamini et al., 2009). ROA may be biased due to off-balance-
sheet activities, but this is expected to be negligible in the case of transition countries.  
Table 3. Variables used in the estimation 
Variables Description Source Expected 
effect 
Dependent variable:  
ROA 
 
Pre-tax profit/total assets 
 
Bankscope 
Independent variables:    
Capital Equity/total assets Bankscope 
Bankscope 
Bankscope 
 
Bankscope 
+ 
Credit risk Loan loss provisions/loans - 
Cost Total cost\pre-tax profit 
(total cost includes overheads and interest expenses) 
- 
Size  Logarithm of total assets + 
HHI Squared sum of bank market share Bankscope 
 
+ 
GDP growth Annual GDP growth World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
(2014) 
+ 
Inflation Annual changes in Consumer Price Index (CPI) +/- 
Government spending A high score indicates less burden imposed by 
government expenditures (score ranges between 0 and 
100) 
Heritage Foundation 
(2014) 
-/+ 
Fiscal freedom Fiscal freedom is a measure of the tax burden imposed 
by the government. A high score indicates less burden 
imposed by fiscal policy (score ranges between 0 and 
100) 
Heritage Foundation 
(2014) 
-/+ 
Monetary freedom A high score indicates greater price stability without 
microeconomic intervention (score ranges between 0 
and 100) 
Heritage Foundation 
(2014) 
-/+ 
 
The loan loss provisions to loans ratio is used to proxy credit risk. The effect on 
profitability is expected to be negative as increased exposure to credit risk is associated with 
decreased bank profitability. The equity to total assets ratio is used to proxy Capital. This is 
expected to have a positive impact, given this represents the amount of bank funds available 
to support business operations, and therefore acts as a safety net in the case of adverse 
developments (Athanasoglou et al., 2008). Moreover, increases in capital may provide a good 
signal of better future prospects for the bank. Cost (or operating costs) is defined as the ratio 
of total cost (overheads and interest expenses) to pre-tax profit. This measures the impact of 
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operating efficiency on bank profitability and therefore is expected to negatively affect bank 
profitability.     
Although, as noted in the literature review, some studies do not find a significant size 
impact on bank profitability, here scale economies and wider product diversity are expected 
to show that larger banks have higher profitability, particularly in these transition countries. 
To include information for all the banks, a concentration variable HHI was calculated.  This 
is the sum of the squares of the market shares of all banks with the industry, following 
(Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011). This is expected to have a positive impact on bank 
profitability, as claimed by the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis.  
Higher GDP growth increases the demand for lending and thus its impact is expected 
to be positive. However, if managers anticipate inflation and reflect it in interest rates the 
effect is positive, otherwise it is negative. The Heritage Foundation’s economic freedom 
variables, such as government spending, fiscal policy and monetary freedom may affect bank 
profitability with different signs. There is no optimal size of government spending and may 
vary between countries, although the impact is likely to be different. However, excessive 
government spending and debt are detrimental to the performance of the financial sector. 
Thus, too much or too little government spending may negatively impact on profitability, 
while a moderate level is expected to influence positively. Additionally, very high or very 
low levels of government spending, as well as fiscal and monetary freedom, may impact 
negatively when the institutions and national governance that are intended to support the 
financial sector are relatively weak.  
3. Data and Methods 
The banking sectors of transition countries have undergone significant changes over the last 
two decades. Particularly, reforms have been pursued to support the further improvements of 
15 
 
the institutional framework, and the more efficient functioning of banks as well in order to 
attract Western banks to enter their markets. This has created a new and more sophisticated 
banking environment with higher degrees of competition. Thus, the econometric modelling of 
bank profitability must take account of the different levels of complexity in this sample and 
the characteristics of the data available.    . 
3.1. Specification of bank profitability model 
Following the literature, the general model to be estimated is a one-way error component 
linear regression model (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011):  
ROAit = c + δROAi, t-1 +  +  +  + εit  (1) 
where ROAit is a return on the assets of bank i at time t with i=1, …, N, t=1, …,T, c is a 
constant term. The ’s are bank-specific, market-specific, macroeconomic and institutional-
environmental variables and εit is the disturbance term, with vi the unobserved bank-specific 
effect and uit the idiosyncratic error. In this model vi ~ (IIN(0, 0, )) and is independent of 
the uit ~ (IIN(0, )).  Recent studies find that bank profits are inclined to persist over time, 
reflecting impediments to market competition, informational opacity and/or sensitivity to 
regional-macroeconomic shocks, especially as these effects are serially correlated (Berger et 
al., 2000). Therefore, in this paper, a lagged dependent variable is included to capture this 
phenomenon, such that ROAi,t-1 is a one-period lagged variable and δ the speed of adjustment 
to equilibrium. δ takes a value between 0 and 1, implying that profits eventually return to 
equilibrium. A value of δ close to 0 shows that the industry is competitive, whilst a value 
close to 1 suggests lower levels of competition.     
Least squares estimators can produce biased and inconsistent coefficients for dynamic 
models (Baltagi, 2008; Bond, 2002). In addition, models to estimate bank profitability may 
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be subject to endogeneity.  Many empirical studies find that more profitable banks can 
increase their equity using retained earnings (García-Herrero et al., 2009) and have more 
extensive marketing budgets, which in turn result in increased expansion and then larger 
banks become more profitable. However, more profitable banks can increase their personnel 
expenses, such as higher consultancy fees, thus reducing their operational efficiency.  This 
suggests that the causality between size and profitability could go in the opposite direction. 
Finally, unobservable heterogeneity between banks, for example, differences in the quality of 
corporate governance, can also impact on bank profitability.  
To address these issues, the generalised method of moments (GMM) is used in the 
estimation, following the approach by Arellano and Bover (Arellano and Bover, 1995). The 
system GMM estimator uses lagged values of a dependent variable in the levels, and in 
differences in instruments as well as lagged values of other independent variables, which 
could potentially suffer from endogeneity. The system GMM has the advantage of 
minimising the data loss for unbalanced panels by transforming the data with forward-
orthogonal deviations (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Roodman, 2009). In addition, the GMM 
estimator controls for unobserved heterogeneity. As a robustness check the models were also 
estimated using a random-effects approach for the same model specification (equation 1).   
3.2. Data 
The sample consists of 275 banks from 16 transition economies.  Eight are from the former 
Soviet Union and are considered to be the late transition group.  These are: Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.  The 
remaining countries are from the CEE and the Baltic States, and are considered to be the 
early transition group.  These are: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia.  The data are from Bankscope and are an unbalanced 
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panel.  All are commercial banks whose financial statements are available for at least three 
years over the period 2000-2013. All the bank relevant data are in US dollars at a current 
exchange rate. The statistics for the growth of GDP and inflation are from the World Bank 
World Development Indicators (2014). The institutional-environmental variables of 
economic freedom are from the Heritage Foundation.  
 
 
4. Empirical results 
Table 4 reports the cross-correlation matrix of independent variables. This indicates that there 
is a relatively high level of correlation between government spending, fiscal freedom and 
monetary freedom variables.  Therefore, only one of the economic freedom variables are 
included in the regression at a time. 
Table 4. Cross-correlation matrix of independent variables 
Variables Late transition countries 
 Mean HHI GDP growth Inflation Government 
Spending 
Fiscal 
freedom 
Monetary 
freedom 
HHI 0.228 1.000      
GDP growth 1.695 0.152*** 1.000     
Inflation 2.324 0.142*** -0.010 1.000    
Government Spending 68,624 -0.114*** 0.325*** -0.216*** 1.000   
Fiscal freedom 83,151 -0.418*** -0.010 -0.259*** 0.268*** 1.000  
Monetary freedom 69.023 -0.328*** 0.113*** -0.418*** 0.466*** 0.379*** 1.000 
 Early transition countries 
HHI 0.220 1.000      
GDP growth 1.284 0.135*** 1.000     
Inflation 1.086 0.127*** 0.176*** 1.000    
Government Spending 43.600 0.195*** 0.327*** 0.107*** 1.000   
Fiscal freedom 72.882 -0.022 0.195*** -0.088*** 0.548*** 1.000  
Monetary freedom 78.349 0.048 0.278 -0.328*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 1.000 
Correlations that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are marked with ***, ** and * 
respectively. GDP growth and inflation are in natural logarithm forms.  
Because of the unbalanced panel, Fisher’s unit root test is used as a suitable approach 
to test the stationary of the variables (Choi, 2001; Maddala and Wu, 1999). The test results 
show that all the variables used are stationary (see Table 5).  
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Table 5. Fisher’s Unit Root test 
Variables Late transition countries 
lags P Z L* Pm 
ROA 1 691.50 (0.00) -13.60 (0.00) -17.63 (0.00) 18.29 (0.00) 
Capital 1 633.35 (0.00) -7.40 (0.00) -12.83 (0.00) 15.78 (0.00) 
Credit risk 1 747.92 (0.00) -13.55 (0.00) -19.55 (0.00) 21.91 (0.00) 
Cost 1 430.98 (0.00) -2.15 (0.02) -4.62 (0.00) 7.15 (0.00) 
Size  1 570.66 (0.00) -2.11 (0.02) -7.83 (0.00) 13.07 (0.00) 
HHI 1 782.81 (0.00) -2.92 (0.00) -11.62 (0.00) 22.24 (0.00) 
GDP growth 1 1422.97 (0.00) -22.62 (0.00) -42.96 (0.00) 52.16 (0.00) 
Inflation 1 432.49 (0.00) -4.89 (0.00) -8.90 (0.00) 7.68 (0.00) 
Government spending 1 430.20 (0.00) -2.69 (0.00) -5.75 (0.00) 7.01 (0.00) 
Government spending2 1 427.64 (0.00) -2.88 (0.00) -5.72 (0.00) 6.90 (0.00) 
Fiscal freedom 1 803.17 (0.00) -9.84 (0.00) -18.11 (0.00) 23.11 (0.00) 
Fiscal freedom2 1 696.42 (0.00) -8.61 (0.00) -14.83 (0.00) 18.50 (0.00) 
Monetary freedom 1 695.06 (0.00) -6.73 (0.00) -11.72 (0.00) 18.45 (0.00) 
Monetary freedom2 1 537.41 (0.00) -4.00 (0.00) -7.68 (0.00) 11.64 (0.00) 
Variables Early transition countries 
ROA 1 520.61 (0.00) -8.95 (0.00) -10.98 (0.00) 10.91 (0.00) 
Capital 1 499.96 (0.00) -4.51 (0.00) -6.98 (0.00) 9.77 (0.00) 
Credit risk 1 334.17 (0.00) -0.60 (0.28) -3.20 (0.00) 4.30 (0.00) 
Cost 1 327.73 (0.01) -1.38 (0.08) -3.35 (0.00) 2.67 (0.00) 
Size  1 382.90 (0.00) 0.01 (0.49) -2.85 (0.00) 4.75 (0.00) 
HHI 1 657.23 (0.00) -6.32 (0.00) -11.79 (0.00) 16.37 (0.00) 
GDP growth 1 461.48 (0.00) -2.04 (0.02) -6.15 (0.00) 9.85 (0.00) 
Inflation 1 572.37 (0.00) -8.35 (0.00) -12.96 (0.00) 13.70 (0.00) 
Government spending 1 619.83 (0.00) -9.36 (0.00) -13.45 (0.00) 14.77 (0.00) 
Government spending2 1 695.20 (0.00) -9.54 (0.00) -15.00 (0.00) 17.99 (0.00) 
Fiscal freedom 1 373.59 (0.00) -2.26 (0.01) -3.90 (0.00) 4.25 (0.00) 
Fiscal freedom2 1 648.12 (0.00) -7.14 (0.00) -11.71 (0.00) 15.98 (0.00) 
Monetary freedom 1 502.40 (0.00) -1.52 (0.06) -4.58 (0.00) 9.76 (0.00) 
Monetary freedom2 1 475.64 (0.00) -1.33 (0.09) -4.08 (0.00) 8.61 (0.00) 
P-values are in brackets.  
Table 6. System GMM results (late transition countries) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
L.ROA 0.692*** 0.684*** 0.686*** 0.685*** 0.684*** 0.689*** 0.690*** 
 (0.172) (0.172) (0.172) (0.173) (0.173) (0.165) (0.166) 
Capital 2.991 3.154 3.116 3.201 3.211 3.113 3.066 
 (2.287) (2.313) (2.301) (2.355) (2.362) (2.222) (2.219) 
Credit risk -5.853*** -5.826*** -5.824*** -5.884*** -5.871*** -5.933*** -5.907*** 
 (0.204) (0.200) (0.199) (0.180) (0.190) (0.168) (0.172) 
Cost -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Size -0.004 0.141 0.099 0.183 0.170 0.191** 0.141* 
 (0.072) (0.095) (0.074) (0.128) (0.115) (0.089) (0.081) 
HHI 0.740 0.577 0.434 1.274 1.063 1.111 0.956 
 (1.007) (0.879) (0.808) (1.107) (1.024) (0.933) (0.954) 
GDP growth -0.017 0.037 0.020 0.041 0.043 0.014 0.015 
 (0.069) (0.051) (0.059) (0.049) (0.047) (0.032) (0.031) 
L.GDP growth -0.156 -0.104 -0.114 -0.097 -0.100 -0.081 -0.083 
 (0.118) (0.088) (0.091) (0.094) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) 
Inflation 0.092 0.010 0.032 0.042 0.039 -0.003 -0.010 
 (0.079) (0.047) (0.048) (0.059) (0.055) (0.053) (0.055) 
L.Inflation -0.224 -0.280 -0.310 -0.147 -0.185 -0.247 -0.251 
 (0.243) (0.246) (0.267) (0.182) (0.206) (0.231) (0.230) 
Government spending  -0.013*      
  (0.007)      
Government spending2   -0.000*     
   (0.000)     
Fiscal freedom    -0.019*    
    (0.011)    
Fiscal freedom2     -0.000*   
     (0.000)   
Monetary freedom      -0.018***  
      (0.006)  
Monetary freedom2       -0.000** 
       (0.000) 
Number of instruments 125 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Sargan-test χ2(104)=665.50 χ2(104)=665.50 χ2(104)=665.50 χ2(104)=665.50 χ2(104)=665.50 χ2(104)=665.50 χ2(104)=665.50 
AB test AR(1) (p-value) (0.222) (0.235) (0.230) (0.231) (0.238) (0.235) (0.224) 
AB test AR(2) (p-value) (0.236) (0.319) (0.318) (0.327) (0.327) 0.326) (0.323) 
Observations 879 879 879 879 879 879 879 
Number of banks 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 
Robust standard errors are in brackets. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
are marked with ***, ** and * respectively. Year dummies for 2000-2010 are removed to save space. Bank-specific 
variables (italicised) are treated as endogenous variables.  
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Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9 summarise the estimation results. In particular, tables 6 and 7 
show the results from the system dynamic panel, and tables 8 and 9 the random-effects panel 
models for the late and early transition countries, respectively. The Sargan test estimation 
results in Tables 6 and 7 point to the absence of over-identifying restrictions. The Arellano-
Bond (AB) tests show the absence of first- and second-order autocorrelation.  
The coefficients on the lagged dependent variable (ROA) are between 0 and 1 
implying that bank profitability persists over time. However, the coefficients are closer to 1 in 
late transition countries and closer to 0 in early transition ones, suggesting that early 
transition countries have more competitive banking sectors, as expected.   
Table 7. System GMM results (early transition countries) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
L.ROA 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.058*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Capital 18.032*** 17.992*** 18.035*** 18.030*** 17.954*** 18.398*** 17.829*** 
 (0.330) (0.313) (0.325) (0.374) (0.305) (0.967) (1.086) 
Credit risk 26.541*** 26.329*** 26.463*** 26.993*** 26.574*** 27.790*** 27.352*** 
 (5.306) (5.405) (5.593) (4.591) (5.309) (4.144) (4.452) 
Cost 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Size -0.312*** -0.331*** -0.325*** -0.277 -0.349*** -0.061 -0.382 
 (0.058) (0.111) (0.064) (0.314) (0.123) (0.613) (0.575) 
HHI 0.066 -0.458 -0.264 -0.375 -0.610 -0.006 -0.658 
 (0.993) (0.937) (1.030) (1.143) (0.905) (1.471) (1.321) 
GDP growth 0.111 0.038 0.053 0.127 0.060 0.161 0.084 
 (0.166) (0.138) (0.145) (0.181) (0.180) (0.159) (0.203) 
L.GDP growth 0.024 -0.041 -0.026 -0.031 -0.073 0.022 -0.085 
 (0.113) (0.134) (0.125) (0.141) (0.122) (0.169) (0.258) 
Inflation -0.122 -0.135 -0.130 -0.130 -0.133 -0.106 -0.113 
 (0.105) (0.120) (0.113) (0.135) (0.109) (0.135) (0.095) 
L.Inflation -0.146 -0.182 -0.159 -0.206 -0.224* -0.213* -0.170 
 (0.130) (0.138) (0.135) (0.165) (0.135) (0.113) (0.166) 
Government spending  0.010      
  (0.019)      
Government spending2   0.000     
   (0.000)     
Fiscal freedom    -0.001    
    (0.037)    
Fiscal freedom2     0.000   
     (0.000)   
Monetary freedom      -0.025  
      (0.069)  
Monetary freedom2       0.000 
       (0.001) 
Number of instruments 30 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Sargan-test χ2(9)=24.81 χ2(9)=25.60 χ2(9)=26.31 χ2(9)=24.86 χ2(9)=25.23 χ2(9)=27.18 χ2(9)=25.21 
AB test AR(1) (p-value) (0.293) (0.341) (0.308) (0.475) (0.238) (0.470) (0.402) 
AB test AR(2) (p-value) (0.349) (0.319) (0.328) (0.412) (0.320) 0.468) (0.367) 
Observations 743 743 743 743 743 743 743 
Number of banks 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 
Robust standard errors are in brackets. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
are marked with ***, ** and * respectively. Year dummies for 2000-2010 are removed to save space. Bank-specific 
variables (italicised) are treated as endogenous variables. 
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The coefficients on Capital are positive and significant in tables 7 and 9, implying 
that better capitalised banks are more profitable in early transition countries. However, this is 
not the case for late transition countries as this variable is not significantly different from zero 
in both sets of models (tables 6 and 8). This is consistent with the literature and supports the 
view that early transition countries have more sound financial conditions.  These banks can 
pursue business opportunities more effectively and have more flexibility in dealing with 
problems arising from unexpected losses (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Pasiouras and 
Kosmidou, 2007).  Again, this is not surprising as they began reforms earlier and there is now 
considerable expertise in the sector. 
The coefficients on Credit risk are significant but with different signs. There is a 
negative effect of credit risk on bank profitability in the late transition countries, while risk 
assessment in  the early reforming countries show that they have had a lot longer to become 
competent at allocating risk and managing uncertainty in competitive markets. This is 
consistent with previous studies that find that the managers of banks in late transition 
countries seem to have adopted a risk-averse strategy, and this suggests that late transition 
countries should focus more on improving the transparency of bank activities (Athanasoglou 
et al., 2008; Sufian and Habibullah, 2010). However, the coefficients on Size, HHI and 
lagged Inflation are not stable across the models and all the remaining control variables 
(Cost, GDP growth, Inflation and their lags) are not statistically different from zero. 
The coefficients on Government spending are statistically significant with negative 
signs for late transition countries, suggesting that government spending has a negative 
relationship to bank profitability. There is no relationship found for the early transition 
countries. Thus, these results support the hypothesis that government spending impacts bank 
profitability in late transition countries only. The estimated coefficients on Fiscal freedom are 
not statistically significant in early transition countries and are significant for late transition 
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countries, but only when the system dynamic panel approach is used. Therefore, the second 
hypotheses, which states that Fiscal freedom affects bank profitability, cannot be accepted. 
However, the results for Monetary freedom are significant with negative signs only for late 
transition countries. This implies that the current level of Monetary freedom negatively 
influences bank profitability in late transition countries. This is consistent with the literature 
that suggests that government interventions in the market is still important to control 
substantial changes in prices and impose monetary targets in late transition countries (Sufian 
and Habibullah, 2010).  Thus, the third hypothesis related to monetary freedom is supported 
for late transition countries only.  
Table 8. Random-effects results (late transition countries) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
L.ROA 0.822*** 0.820*** 0.820*** 0.822*** 0.822*** 0.824*** 0.822*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Capital 1.221*** 1.224*** 1.228*** 1.212*** 1.213*** 1.150*** 1.188*** 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.141) (0.140) 
Credit risk -5.719*** -5.703*** -5.705*** -5.719*** -5.717*** -5.780*** -5.745*** 
 (0.204) (0.204) (0.204) (0.204) (0.204) (0.204) (0.204) 
Cost 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size 0.080** 0.078** 0.079** 0.070** 0.071** 0.070** 0.072** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) 
HHI 1.537*** 1.165** 1.197** 1.330*** 1.337*** 1.028** 1.195*** 
 (0.428) (0.467) (0.468) (0.450) (0.451) (0.452) (0.447) 
GDP growth 0.035 0.057 0.053 0.048 0.048 0.032 0.034 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) 
L.GDP growth -0.116* -0.090 -0.091 -0.107 -0.108 -0.071 -0.080 
 (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) 
Inflation 0.123 0.083 0.092 0.111 0.111 0.046 0.058 
 (0.087) (0.089) (0.089) (0.087) (0.087) (0.089) (0.090) 
L.inflation -0.128 -0.147 -0.152 -0.146 -0.145 -0.248** -0.214** 
 (0.096) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.102) (0.102) 
Government spending  -0.007**      
  (0.004)      
Government spending2   -0.000*     
   (0.000)     
Fiscal freedom    -0.016    
    (0.011)    
Fiscal freedom2     -0.000   
     (0.000)   
Monetary freedom      -0.024***  
      (0.007)  
Monetary freedom2       -0.000*** 
       (0.000) 
Constant -0.800** -0.227 -0.451 0.744 0.041 1.410* 0.419 
 (0.324) (0.434) (0.378) (1.084) (0.681) (0.729) (0.572) 
        
Observations 893 893 893 893 893 893 893 
Number of banks 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 
Robust standard errors are in brackets. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
are marked with ***, ** and * respectively. Year dummies for 2000-2010 are removed to save space.  
 
Squared terms were included to attempt to gain deeper insights into the conventional 
wisdom that too much of a good thing can be harmful to financial performance.  Thus, non-
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linear versions to identify dynamic effects, such as Government spending
2
, Fiscal freedom
2
 
and Monetary freedom
2
 have mixed results.  In early transition countries these are statistically 
not significant. However, Government spending
2
 and Monetary freedom
2
 are statistically 
significant with negative signs for late transition countries. Since their coefficients are much 
closer to zero than those on Government spending and Monetary freedom, this suggests that 
policy-makers in late transition countries could significantly increase government spending, 
and improve the monetary freedom if they wish to lessen their negative impact on bank 
profitability. The coefficient on Fiscal freedom
2
 is significant only when system GMM is 
used in late transition countries and thus no robust conclusions can be drawn on these issues.  
 Table 9. Random-effects regression results (early transition countries) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
L.ROA 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Capital 4.978*** 4.921*** 4.938*** 4.933*** 4.930*** 5.037*** 5.043*** 
 (0.509) (0.510) (0.510) (0.508) (0.508) (0.510) (0.511) 
Credit risk 13.719*** 13.669*** 13.682*** 13.625*** 13.630*** 13.765*** 13.773*** 
 (1.145) (1.144) (1.144) (1.146) (1.145) (1.150) (1.151) 
Cost 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size -0.020 -0.022 -0.022 -0.026 -0.026 -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
HHI 0.555 0.481 0.492 0.520 0.528 0.566 0.570 
 (0.943) (0.950) (0.952) (0.944) (0.943) (0.946) (0.946) 
GDP growth 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.022 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) 
L.GDP growth 0.081 0.078 0.079 0.094 0.094 0.080 0.079 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) 
Inflation -0.050 -0.046 -0.049 -0.053 -0.053 -0.050 -0.049 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) 
L.Inflation -0.132** -0.138*** -0.135*** -0.130** -0.129** -0.130** -0.129** 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.054) (0.054) 
Government spending  -0.003      
  (0.004)      
Government spending2   -0.000     
   (0.000)     
Fiscal freedom    -0.007    
    (0.008)    
Fiscal freedom2     -0.000   
     (0.000)   
Monetary freedom      0.001  
      (0.012)  
Monetary freedom2       0.000 
       (0.000) 
Constant -0.336 -0.178 -0.261 0.223 -0.029 -0.462 -0.455 
 (0.540) (0.592) (0.561) (0.860) (0.651) (1.155) (0.767) 
        
Observations 747 747 747 747 747 747 747 
Number of id 129 129 129 129 129 129 129 
Robust standard errors are in brackets. Coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
are marked with ***, ** and * respectively. Year dummies for 2000-2010 are removed to save space.  
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper, the profitability of banks in early and late reforming transition economies was 
examined, where institutional-environmental variables were used in addition to the traditional 
performance indicators. The main conclusion is that the determinants of bank profitability 
vary across transition countries as they are at different stages in their move to a market 
economy. Several specific conclusions can be drawn from the results. Firstly, the banking 
sector of early transition countries is more competitive. This is to be expected as poor 
performers are allowed to fail and the efficient banks survive. Secondly, the impact of credit 
risk on bank profitability is positive in early transition countries, while this is negative for late 
transition countries, so clearly there is a great deal for the late reformers to learn about how to 
assess and allocate risk within the pricing structure. Thirdly, government spending and 
monetary freedom negatively influence bank profitability in late transition countries.  This 
may simply imply that banks are not sufficiently prepared to compete in a market 
environment. Fourthly, better capitalised banks are more profitable in early transition 
countries as the overall sector is more robust and they benefit from sound financial 
management.  
This study has found a number of weaknesses in bank performance in the late 
reforming countries, most of which were part of the former Soviet Union.  Several possible 
policy conclusions arise from this that may improve the sector and increase profitability.  
Firstly, the quality of asset allocation must be improved as credit risk is negatively impacting 
profitability. Therefore, states should encourage the development of capital markets to 
improve the transparency of banks, and provide for better screening and monitoring of bank 
activities. This involves training in credit assessment and risk allocation.  The presence of 
foreign banks is still limited in some of the former USSR countries, and if the sector was 
more open then knowledge transfer from foreign to domestic banks could take place.  In 
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addition, increased competition would improve efficiency as good practice would be spread 
throughout the sector to the advantage of the domestic banks.  
Secondly, government spending in the sector could improve capitalisation, especially 
through special industry-specific programmes (Smallbone and Welter, 2001).  But crucially, 
the institutions need to be improved, such as the legal system and more educational support 
should be provided within the banking sector. Thirdly, states can support the banking sector 
by significantly improving the level of monetary freedom. Most of the late transition 
countries have not completed the reform process, and the independence of their central banks 
and monetary policy is still questionable.  
Overall, the results indicate that bank profitability in the transition countries is shaped 
by bank-specific and institutional variables. However, future research may integrate specific 
information on management expertise, the contribution of board members and the level of 
corruption in banks to understand profitability in financial institutions.   
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